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While support for strengthening financial regulation was unanimous after the 
financial crisis (with the customary exception of both radical groups and financial 
lobbies2), there have been recently some notable breaches in the consensus. Prominent 
European politicians have publicly expressed the idea that a break was needed to 
complete an overall assessment of past work (EP 2016), “remove unnecessary burden” 
and cut red tape (Brunsden 2015), while some took a more aggressive stance in front of 
their domestic audience: Emmanuel Macron (2016) and Gianfelice Rocca (Sanderson 
2016) have been vocal against excessive financial regulation, which would have become a 
burden for corporations, and might be responsible for the enduring recession in the 
European Union. The same argue that US and emerging countries quickly recovered 
after the 2007 financial crisis and resumed growth in 2 years at most, so they enjoyed a 
full business cycle before experiencing the current slowdown. On the contrary, Europe 
has experienced a protracted financial crisis, with commercial banks failures and 
fragilities not yet resolved as recent developments in Portugal (Wise 2016) and Italy (Hale 
2016) have proven. At the same time, the economy has been growing slowly or negatively 
in the during the last years, especially in the Eurozone: fiscal consolidation and banking 
sector balance sheet unwinding had an obvious negative macroeconomic impact. With 
the economic policy offering some relief, as an EU-centered scheme (the Juncker Plan) 
opened opportunities for removing targeted government expenses from deficit 
constraints, and ECB flooded the markets with cheap money and promises to continue, 
one should have expected the beginning of business cycle to rely on credit. Loans to 
corporations notwithstanding failed to improve as graph 1 shows, and GDP growth 
stayed weaker than before the crisis.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We	  wish	  to	  thank	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Laurent	  and	  Nuno	  Coimbra	  for	  their	  advice	  and	  comments.	  All	  errors	  remain	  ours.	  2	  Such	  as	  the	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance,	  see	  IIF	  (2010),	  (2011).	  
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.61
 
 
Figure 1 – GDP and amount outstanding of loans to NFC in the Eurozone, €m 
 
source: ECB statistical datawarehouse 
 
The situation is especially worrying for SME, which account for 67% of EU employment 
(in Non-Financial Corporations) since “SME bank lending has suffered a significant 
backdrop in volumes, from a peak of EUR 95 billion in mid-2008 to approximately EUR 
54 billion in 2013/2014” (EBA 2016b p. 8). SME  are especially reliant on bank credit 
(through overdraft or loans) since they enjoy limited access to other financing options 
available to larger corporations (figure 2 from EBA 2016b p. 19), especially from 
securitisation, which is low in Europe in comparison with the US (see the next chapter 
by Daphné Héant et al.). 
 
Figure 2 – Access to funding sources 2015 H2 in % of firms 
 
source: ECB statistical datawarehouse 
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As conventional and unconventional economic policy tools seems to have exhausted 
their virtue, one can then ask whether the overall tightening of bank regulation is not 
responsible for the current state of low growth and missing foregone business cycle 
through declining credit to corporations, especially to the smaller ones.   
 
In order to answer this question, one must maybe look at the currently implemented or 
announced measures, which imposed new costs to financial institutions, these costs 
being eventually paid by the customer. But the expected developments might also 
matter: banks might be reacting to the expected future regulation, and the credit 
tightening might be the result of uncertainty aversion in a context of uncertain public 
policies. It would be thus difficult to assess the steady state impact of any regulatory 
measure. Moreover, nonconventional monetary policies are distorting the usual 
economic signals: first, negative interest rates on deposits with the European central 
bank plus repeated QE operations have driven short terms returns so low that investors 
and banks together have lost their usual points of reference in the risk/return space. In 
the case of banks, many observers believe their economic model is being deeply 
challenged by both the flatness of yield curve (return on maturity transformation) and 
the low level of interest rates (return on deposits). Conversely, current regulation might 
be interpreted as a mild constraint: the single resolution mechanism, for instance, is 
designed to organize bail-in and rescue troubled banks without the influx of taxpayer 
money, but the whole scheme is just a tentative ‘credible threat’ since nobody really 
expects, in the current European economic environment, that governments will let any 
large bank get bankrupt, endangering the whole economy. Hence implicit government 
support still biases the risk/return arbitrage in a way, which is difficult to determine. 
Given these 3 problems (1. Convergence is not steady state, 2. QE displaces and distorts 
the yield curve, 3. Changing implicit government support), it seems especially difficult to 
understand how the new Basel III metrics changes the Basel II-adjusted risk/return 
filtering, transforming the asset-side structure of banks’ balance sheets.  
 
While it seem difficult to answer such a complex problem, we will try to disentangle the 
effect of every set of causes, taking into account expected future rules. The rest of this 
chapter is organized as follows: we will first recall the main novelties of the Basel III 
package as implemented in the UE (1.) before we turn to impact assessments (2.), trying 
to answer the question: what definite constraint is binding at the moment? (3.) 
Eventually section (4.) will offer some remediation before concluding. 
 
 
1. Novelties of Basel III (CRD IV/CRR) and their anticipated effects on lending 
The European implementation of the Basel III package (through CRD IV and CRR) aims 
at “[strengthening] the resilience of the EU banking sector so it would be better placed 
to absorb economic shocks while ensuring that banks continue to finance economic 
activity and growth” (EC 2013), especially in Europe where banks are the main financing 
actors (Schackmann-Falli-Weiss 2014). Among the novelties of the Basel III regulatory 
package, the most significant in terms of impact on corporate lending practices are likely 
to be capital requirements (1.1.), overall leverage (1.2.), and liquidity ratios (1.3.). Let us 
review them in this order. 
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1.1. Capital requirements 
Basel III increased the capital requirements in order to strengthen the banks at a 
microprudential level: table 1 describes the increase in overall quantity, but the capital 
quality is also enhanced and the risk weighted assets (RWA) computation rules are 
stiffened so that overall the amount of required capital for a given balance sheet has 
been raised (see Jean-Paul Laurent’s contribution in this volume, section 2).  The table 
also features the systemic risk surcharge imposed by the Financial Stability Board, which 
has still to be passed in European law. 
 
Table 1 – regulatory capital requirements: Basel II vs. Basel III 
 
Capital category 
Basel II reqd cap 
%RWA 
Basel III reqd 
cap 
%RWAs of 2016 
Authority in 
charge 
Common Equity 
Tier 1 capital 
≅4 4.5 ECB or National 
Supervisor (1) 
Additional Tier 1 
capital 
0 1.5 ECB or National 
Supervisor 
Tier 2 capital 
T2: max 100% of 
T1 
T3: max 250% of 
market risk T1 
2 ECB or National 
Supervisor 
Capital 
conservation 
buffer 
0 2.5 ECB or National 
Supervisor 
Partial sum  
(basic capital) 
8% 10.5 Multiplier: 1.31 
Countercyclical 
buffer 
0 0-2.5 
National 
Competent 
Authority 
G-SIB Buffer 0 0-5 
Financial 
Stability Board 
D-SIB Buffer 0 0-5 
National 
Competent 
Authority 
(Pillar 2 buffers) 0 0-2 ECB 
TLAC 8% 10,5%-20% 
Multiplier: 1.31-
2.5 
 
(1) ECB for ECB directly supervised banks3, National Supervisory Authorities for 
other financial institutions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Since	   the	   4th	   of	   November	   2014,	   “significant”	   banks	   are	   directly	   supervised	   by	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank.	  According	  to	  Council	  Regulation	  (EU)	  No	  1024/2013	  art.	  6,	  a	  bank	  is	  deemed	  significant	  if	  it	  fulfills	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  following	  conditions	  (1)	  The	  value	  of	  its	  assets	  exceeds	  €30	  billion;	  (2.)	  The	  value	  of	  its	  assets	  exceeds	  both	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The table shows that the basic capital amount is only lightly impacted (10.5% instead of 
8%) but the Total Loss Absorption Capacity might be as high as 20% for banks with 
maximum systemic surcharge: this would commend a 150% increase over the Basel II 
framework. Recent reports have measured the actual increase in regulatory capital: from 
5.5% to 12.5% between 2009Q1 and 2014Q4 in the US (Tier 1 alone, Fed 2015 p. 2), from 
4.9% to 12% in Eurozone between the December 2010 QIS and the EBA Monitoring 
Exercise of September 2015 (Group 1 banks4 only, Quignon 2016 p. 25). These are overall 
figures, though, and the specific provision of regulatory capital for business loans is not 
distinguished. It seems reasonable to conjecture that these provisions have increased in 
a slightly higher proportion, since corporate debt is in the higher bracket of capital 
requirement, especially in comparison with mortgage loans or EU sovereign bonds5. 
 
At this point, we established a concomitance between increased capital requirements 
and decreasing loans to financial corporations. This is not a satisfying causal 
explanation, though, but a partial description of the Basel III framework 
implementation. Let us proceed to the other features of the same package. 
 
1.2. Overall leverage 
The Basel III framework requires the banks to have their capital equal to 3% at least 
of their balance sheet; this limit implies a maximum 33:1 leverage. While this is not 
directly binding for corporate lending, as the basic capital charge of 10.5% imply a 9.5:1 
leverage (which is often less as corporate loans can be charged above 100% of the basic 
requirements according to the borrower’s creditworthiness), it might be indirectly 
binding. Banks listed in the US are required to apply a Supplementary Leverage Ratio of 
5%, or 6% for IDR, Insured Depository Institutions. But US banks are far above this floor: 
the last published figure was 8.8% on average (Fed 2015 p.  3), with the only two banks in 
the sample missing the stress tests being US branches of European banks. For Group 1 
European banks competing at a global level, it seems almost impossible to steadily 
display lower figures than their American counterparts, hence capital build-up might not 
be over. If we take in consideration the average US banks leverage as the “desired 
leverage”, it might become a binding constraint as most assets carry a capital charge 
lower than corporate loans: the former might thus contribute to the saturation of the 
leverage constraint, effectively crowding out the later.  
 
1.3. Liquidity ratios 
Basel III features two liquidity ratios: a short term Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
under progressive implementation in the EU and a longer term Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR) whose possible implementation remains to be decided. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  €5	  billion	  and	  20%	  of	  the	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  of	  the	  member	  state	  in	  which	  it	  is	  located;	  further	  regulation	  added;	  (3.)	  The	  bank	  is	  among	  the	  three	  most	  significant	  banks	  of	  the	  country	  in	  which	  it	  is	  located;	  (4.)	  The	  bank	  has	  large	  cross-­‐border	  activities	  and	  (5.)	  	  The	  bank	  receives,	  or	  has	  applied	  for,	  assistance	  from	  Eurozone	  bailout	  funds	  (the	  European	  Stability	  Mechanism	  or	  European	  Financial	  Stability	  Facility).	  4	  Group	  1	  banks	  are	  banks	  with	  Tier	  1	  capital	  in	  excess	  of	  EUR	  3	  billion	  and	  internationally	  active.	  All	  other	  banks	  are	  categorised	  as	  Group	  2	  banks.	  5	  In	  the	  standardized	  risk	  approach,	  corporate	  debt	  must	  be	  backed	  by	  20%	  (for	  AAA-­‐rated	  borrowers)	  to	  150%	  of	  the	  standard	  regulatory	  capital	  provision,	  while	  claims	  secured	  by	  residential	  property	  only	  need	  35%	  of	  the	  standard	  provision	  and	  EU	  sovereign	  debt	  0%.	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1.3.1. Short-term liquidity  
The LCR is defined as the ratio of the value of the stock of High Quality Liquid Assets 
(in stressed conditions) divided by net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days. It is 
supposed to be above 70% in 2016, with this constraint being stiffened in the coming 
years (80% from 1 January 2017, and 100% from 1 January 2018). It is thus expected that 
LCR implementation will have a growing, effect on lending since loans are not liquid, 
hence they do not count in the numerator of the LCR. On the other hand, this effect is 
only indirect: only banks with an insufficient volume of liquid assets might be restricted 
from lending. For this reason, the European banking authority is minimizing the effect 
of LCR on bank lending behavior (EBA 2014 p. 23). Is it any different for the long-term 
ratio? 
 
1.3.2. Long-term liquidity 
The NSFR is such that Available Stable Funding divided by Required Stable Funding on a 
one-year horizon should be above 100%. These quantities may be computed using 
haircuts detailed in BCBS 2014: ASF weighs liabilities (for instance Tier 1 regulatory 
capital is weighted at 100% while deposits are weighted between 50% and 95% according 
to their stability) and RSF weighs assets (from 0% for coins and banknotes to 100% for 
assets encumbered for a period of one year or more). This being said, most performing 
corporate loans are weighted at 85% (non-performing loans receiving a 100% weight). 
This means that bank must hold not only regulatory capital but also 85% of the amount 
lent as stable funding, for instance 85% of regulatory capital or 85:0.9=94.44% on stable 
deposit accounts of the amount lent. This constraint would likely be binding for many 
banks, if only NSFR were due for implementation in the EU. At the moment there is no 
deadline for such plan, but the European Banking Authority is pushing for NSFR 
implementation (EBA 2015).  
 
The obvious conclusion of this first section is that lending to business is likely to be 
penalized by almost every aspect of the new regulatory package. This is leading us to the 
question of the overall effect of this package on economic growth via the firm-financing 
channel. 
 
 
2. Regulatory impact on financing businesses: 
In this section, we will distinguish between impact studies reliant on the interest-rate 
methodology (2.1.) from newer one, which were inspired by new theoretical 
developments (2.2.). The latter seem to better fit the current state of the EU economy but 
the former are still usually produced and cited, see e. g. Quginon (2016). 
 
2.1. Interest-rate reliant impact studies 
The earliest assessments of the Basel III package addressed an important causal chain: 
rising regulatory capital will raise the cost of borrowing leading to reduction in lending 
and ultimately to less output. Oliveira Santos, Elliott (2012) for instance, surveyed the 
early impact studies carried on by the regulators (BCBS) and the industry (IIF) (Table 2) 
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Table 2 
 
 
All these impact studies concluded that the additional capital requirements were likely 
to substantially raise the borrowing costs, leading to falling equilibrium lending with a 
definite impact on GDP. More recently, Quignon argued that the rise in regulatory 
capital (+7% of RWA) was far higher than considered by BCBS 2010 assessments (+1.3%), 
hence the consequences should be reassessed and the impact on growth would appear 
more significant. 
 
The problem with all these studies is obvious since they rely on a transmission 
mechanism, which has been de-activated by the ECB monetary policy since the massive 
quantitative easing carried on under Mario Draghi’s presidency. Figure 3 shows how the 
banks cost of lending sharply decreased after the €489bn package of December 2011, the 
LTRO of February 2012 and the beginning of the QE in September 2012. Although the 
Joint Committee recently stated that the banks margins were “low (…) in the context of a 
low interest rate environment” (JC 2016 p. 4), the borrowing costs could hardly be lower. 
Hence the negative effects pointed out by the aforementioned array of impact studies are 
likely to have disappeared with the current monetary policy. 
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Figure 3 – Composite cost of bank deposit and bond financing 
 
 
Sources: ECB 2015 p. 38 
Notes: Average of deposit rates on new business and cost of market debt funding 
weighted with their corresponding outstanding amounts. Vertical lines denote the 
announcement dates of the respective measures. The latest observation is for July 2015. 
 
One could still ask whether the impact studies were not pointing to substantial issues for 
the years 2009-2013, as the borrowing costs were still high and likely to be raised by the 
imminence of Basel III implementation. According to the ECB credit monitor data, it is 
likely that loan demand was depressed when the crisis broke out in 2008-2009 then 
around 2012 (Figure 4). On the contrary, the net percentage of banks reporting positive 
loan demand from NFC was high during 2010 and 2011, and it began to rise again since 
2012 Q4, the growth of loans still being negative.  It seems then that, while demand for 
loans from NFC has been low in the wake of the crisis, it is rising now since the 
beginning of QE, but the amount lent failed to pick up yet. It is then necessary to ask 
whether this failure is not the side effect of the Basel III package, as we have seen some 
reason to think it might be. New theoretical grounds have been given to assess the 
performance of the newly implemented reform. 
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Figure 4: Changes in demand and amount growth for loans or credit lines to 
enterprises in EU (net percentages of banks reporting positive demand).  
 
Source : ECB statistical datawarehouse 
 
2.2. New theoretical developments 
In 2008, Borio and Zhu issued a seminal contribution, first as BIS working paper 
republished as a Journal article in 2012. The title explicitly mentioned risk-taking as a 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. It thus rationalized the idea that the impact of 
the Basel III package not only depended on interest rate. In particular, the paper 
discusses the difference between threshold effect in capital requirements (which raises the 
borrowing cost, as already seen) and framework effect, which might twist asset allocation 
as some classes of assets might be favoured or incentivized by the overall framework 
while others would not. EU sovereign bonds, for instance, benefit from positive 
framework effect, and it shall be asked whether corporate loans were not negatively 
affected by the framework effect. 
 
The question was given a more general scope with the development of the risk-taking 
channel concept, which inaugurated a huge literature, involving both theoretical and 
empirical research. Basically, the risk-taking channel is a possible new channel of 
monetary policy, which leads investors to invest more, when interest rate fall, than 
investment function of interest rate would have predicted. Three convergent effects are 
at work with the risk-taking channel:  
 
• “One set of effects operates through the impact of interest rates on valuations, 
incomes and cash flows.” This is the idea behind the real balance effect of Pigou 
(1943) or financial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1999), allowing for “time-varying 
risk aversion…”, which makes it even more procyclical than the former. In this 
respect, lowering interest rate through monetary policy not only make investors 
richer, hence more willing to spend and invest all things being equal; they might 
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also experience a drop in their risk aversion leading to even higher spending and 
investment. 
• “A second set of effects operates through the relationship between market rates 
and target rates of return” This is to say that institutions linked by a sticky rate 
(life insurance companies with a contractual rate of return, for instance) might 
experience a margin squeeze with relaxed monetary policy: these institutions then 
engage in search for yield, which lead to select riskier assets. 
• “ A third set of effects operates through the communication policies and reaction 
function of the central bank. (…) By increasing the degree of transparency or 
commitment accompanying specific moves, and hence removing uncertainty 
about the future, the central bank can compress risk premia—a “transparency 
effect”, adding an extra kick to the effect of those moves.” This is more or less the 
theoretical rationalization of new communication policies such as forward 
guidance. 
 
The paper triggered a tidal wave of empirical research, for instance Antipa-Matheron 
(2014) established with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model calibrated to 
euro area data that forward guidance is very effective at the ‘zero lower bound’ (= zero 
nominal discount rate), by providing a substantial boost to demand and reducing the 
costs of private deleveraging at the same time.  The underlying mechanism relies on 
inflation announcement that create negative real interest rate expectations. In the 
Eurozone, though, the main financing operations rate has been below inflation since 
2011, but ECB failed both to raise inflation enough to produce definitely negative real 
interest rates expectation, and to have the amount lent to NFC picking up with pre-crisis 
level. Overall, while QE is hopefully negating the impact of Basel III on interest rates, 
the risk-taking channel is not working as intended. We shall then ask, given the 
previously gathered evidence, which element of the reform package appears to act as 
binding constraint in lending to corporations? 
 
3. What is the binding constraint? 
Taking together unpalatable empirical facts (3.1.) with theoretical explanations for the 
mixed results of the Basel III implementation (3.2.) we try to offer a convincing narrative 
(3.3.). 
 
3.1. unpalatable empirical facts 
We would like to introduce at three categories of such facts. 
 
Measurement error 
A recent paper in ECB 2015 has shown that the previously issued statistics on amount 
lent were reporting optimistic figures in comparison with the new methodology 
implemented in September 2015. While the difference appear (figure 5) small for NFC 
(one half of a growth point in 2015 and even less for the previous years) in comparison 
with households for instance (more than one point), the new methodology confirms that 
the amount outstanding of loans to NFC diminished for the 2012Q3-2015Q4 period, while 
banks were reporting increasing funding demand from the NFC. 
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Figure 5:  annual growth rate, seasonally adjusted – dotted line: pre-September 2015 
methodology; solid line: post-September 2015 methodology 
 
(Source ECB) 
Loan rejection figures 
We have just established that, from 2012Q3 to 2015 Q4 the amount outstanding of loans 
to NFC has been falling, although business demand was significantly increasing. During 
that time, loan rejections figures consistently dropped (see figure 6). The only way to 
account for these statistics and to make them consistent would be that the banks are 
granting more loans, but constraining more tightly the amount lent per application, so 
that the global outstanding volume would be stalling. Such rationing behaviour would 
not allow the businesses to carry on their projects, barring a significant recovery of 
investment, output and employment.  
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Figure 6 – loans rejection evolution 
 
Source: ECB statistical datawarehouse 
 
Bank asset-side unwinding 
It shall be emphasized that, in the Eurozone, the fulfilling of regulatory constraints has 
not been obtained only by raising the amount of regulatory capital but also by a 
reduction of the RWA, as figure 7 shows. It is quite likely, then, that in order to save 
capital, the most impacted assets were those with the higher RWA per €: corporate loans 
might hence have been impacted for this reason. While one may think this gives reason 
to hope this is over now that the banks have enough regulatory capital, one might not 
forget that 1. US leverage rules and 2. EU rules under overhaul (such as credit risk 
measurement) are likely to induce prudence from the banks. Unless it has been proved, 
this argument remains theoretical, though. 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of CET1 capital vs RWA over time (for Group 1 banks) under full 
implementation of CRD IV – CRR. 
 
(Source EBA) 
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3.2. theoretical explanations 
In his a chapter of section 2 from this book, Jean-Paul Laurent insisted the quantitative 
impact studies so far proved to be wrong for three reasons at least: the were done on the 
basis of pre-reform portfolios likely to be changed once the reform was enacted, then the 
contribution of banks to impact studies were probably (selection-) biased, eventually the 
exact rules were not determined, hence the banks’ response could not be considered 
reliable. We would like to stress the later phenomenon. 
 
The mechanism discovered by the risk-taking channel, especially the ‘forward guidance 
channel’ is likely to work if it builds up significant inflationary expectations, but every 
empirical evidence show that it does not work as of spring 2016. On the contrary, as the 
amount lent is not picking up, negative expectations are at work on the banks’ side. The 
most likely reason of these negative expectations might be the future evolution of 
regulation: BCBS 2015 is asking for a revision of the credit risk standard approach 
measurement, while EBA has launched a regulatory review of the internal rating based 
approach (EBA 2016a) which is likely to lead to stiffened risk valuation model, hence 
increased regulatory capital for credit risk, that is, for corporate loans. There is nothing 
certain in this process, except that the banks are reacting prudently. Eventually it might 
happen that the binding constraint be the banks’ expectations about future regulation. 
 
Contrary to a widely shared opinion, according to which the banks have lobbyists in 
Brussels, which allow them to influence the regulator, there are good reasons for banks 
to be overly risk averse in appraising the future state of regulation since they currently 
have no power to shape its evolution. We already mentioned that US leverage regulation 
has an impact on US-listed European banks: here they have no command of a regulatory 
impact which is quite subtle as the problem is not about the leverage itself, but about 
how investors would perceive a higher leverage of EU banks. Another very delicate issue 
at the moment is the competition among authorities: this is the situation where authorities 
do not coordinate themselves in order to produce aligned incentives. If we take for 
instance the regulatory capital, then it is clear that the EU rules organised a playing field, 
which is neither level nor coordinated. Looking back at our table 1, one notice that group 
2 banks which are not supervised by the SSM have their capital requirements checked 
(and pillar 2 buffers decided) by their national supervisor and their countercyclical buffer 
tuned by their nationally competent authority (which is usually not the same as the 
supervisor). For group 2 banks supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism and 
group 1 non-globally systemic banks, this SSM (ECB) plays the role of the national 
supervisor. Eventually, for Group 1 globally systemic banks (G-SIB), that G-SIB is 
decided by the FSB. That is to say: these banks depend on national (CCB), European 
(pillar 2 + supervision) and global (FSB) regulators, with no one being able to commit to 
a comprehensive capital level. It seems clear thus that the bank interpret the future 
decisions of these competing authorities as potentially more damaging if they 1. were 
used to a rather familiar relationship with their formerly unique supervisor, 2. do acquire 
risky assets such as corporate loans. 
 
The ‘risk-taking channel’ of monetary policy is just not effective enough as of spring 
2016, while the risk-taking channel of anticipated regulation is probably strengthening 
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the bank’ overall risk aversion. This is the end of the narrative we sketched so far, let us 
describe it more completely. 
 
3.3. A narrative since the crisis 
The following table summarizes the information of this section. The pre-crisis and 
immediate post-crisis profile led to falling amount of NFC financing as a consequence of 
the slowdown: while demand has been slowly growing in 2009-2010, the banks have been 
strongly turning down NFC demand for additional credit as a result of growing risk 
aversion against crisis (2008), then against possible, plausible and imminent reform: as 
soon as January 2009, the BCBS offered a consultative document about ‘proposed 
enhancement of to the Basel II framework’; the Basel III package was eventually 
disclosed in December 2010, with CRD IV proposed by the European Commission in 
July of 2011, voted two years later for implementation on July 1st, 2014. Hence the 
likelihood of reforms has been increasing since 2009 in a harsh environment, were banks 
were made responsible for the financial crisis and the subsequent economic misfortunes, 
and were submitted to a regulatory avalanche that was not built as a consistent project 
but as a pile of recriminations.  
 
Year Banks 
RWA 
Demand 
for loans 
NFC loans 
outstanding 
amount 
growth 
Constraint 
by new 
regulation 
Constraint 
by 
anticipated 
future 
regulation 
2008  Falling Slowing  No No 
2009  Low Negative No Possibly 
2010  Rising Negative No Possibly 
2011 Rising Falling Constant No Likely 
2012 Falling Falling Negative No Likely 
2013 Falling Rising Negative Likely Almost 
certain 
2014 Constant Rising Negative Likely Almost 
certain 
2015 Rising Rising Constant Likely Almost 
certain 
 
While demand for loans was clearly depressed in 2011-2012, it is hard to believe that 
future reform was playing a definite role in the falling amount of loans. But when 
demand picked up in 2013, the banks did not follow. As Basel III/CRD was about to be 
implemented, the banks lowered their RWA to meet the regulatory capital standard, and 
it is likely that they did this by cutting first the most capital intensive assets, such as 
corporate loans. The lowering of the interest rate down to zero by the relaxed monetary 
policy beginning in late 2011 was not enough. In 2014 and 2015, demand for loans from 
NFC grew stronger without the effective loans outstanding to rise. It seems that, forward 
guidance and extreme monetary policy, although they were theoretically justified to 
deliver a boost to corporate borrowing, could not work as the banks were frightened 
with projected implementation of further capital buffers to be decided by unpredictable 
authorities: while the financial macroeconomists were theorizing lowering risk aversion 
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through clever monetary policy, banks were experiencing rising uncertainty aversion in 
front of a regulatory future they could no longer see through or influence. 
 
The remaining questions are whether this state of affairs is going to last, and what can be 
done to ease up the recovery. 
 
4. From prevision to recommendations 
Recent initiative by the European Commission give us some insights of what is going to 
happen in the next few months. (4.1.). Then we offer some recommendations to lead the 
next steps of banking regulation and business-driven growth (4.2.). 
 
4.1. Plausible next months 
Loans to NFC are not likely to restart strongly as there is a backlog of troubled assets 
(non performing loans in Italian banks, for instance), plus uncertain future steps of 
regulation. Even straightforward incentives such as the SME supporting factor, which 
amounted to reducing by almost 30% the capital charges for loans to SME, were not met 
with any success in 2015 (EBA 2016b). This might be considered as a sign of extreme 
uncertainty aversion by the banks. 
 
Fortunately, as EBA 2016b, the SME supporting factor will continue to incentivize 
lending to SME in the near future, and it will be subjected to further close monitoring. 
That will enable to track as early as possible either the furthering of uncertainty aversion 
or the shift to a lesser risk-averse bank asset choice policy. It is not unlikely that further 
regulatory evolution will be necessary to trigger this latter move.  
 
4.2. Tuning regulation to trigger growth 
If we have been correct in diagnosing that the binding factor of corporate lending was 
anticipated regulation by banks, then it seems crucial to address that particular source of 
bank uncertainty aversion. We have identified competition among authorities as a possible 
source of uncertainty aversion, this concept being effective both at the legal and 
supervisory level. In order to ease up this concern, it might be fruitful to move toward a 
more consistent design and implementation of the regulatory package. A pause for 
assessment of the existing reforms, as asked for by the European Parliament, seems 
reasonable.  
 
As we have show, regulatory capital is a example of potential competition among 
authorities, as we have shown it was decided by up to three different authorities at three 
different levels without any consistency checks. Moving away from the coordination 
issues implied by competition among authorities would imply aligning the role of 
stakeholders: this could be achieved only via a consistent regulatory framework. One 
could think basically that the supervisor should check the compliance of capital 
requirements and internal models with regulations; while a banking authority could 
design the models to measure the risks experienced by the banks. Eventually, the 
acceptable level of risk with every institution (i. e. microprudential) must be decided by 
the law, while the systemic risk policy might be taken care of by a higher level authority, 
either purposive or political, which would set up dedicated capital pockets to address 
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designated risks, the breakdown among banking institutions would be made according to 
risk measures provided by models designed by the banking authority. 
 
In this “pyramidal” model (supreme macroprudential authority deciding “risk budgets”, 
banking authority designing risk measurement models, supervisor verifying that they are 
correctly implemented into banks) there seem to be no conflict among authority… but 
possible agency conflicts: these might be addressed through classical incentives. At least, 
the signal to banks would be clear and reliable, excluding uncertainty aversion. Macron 
2016 made a very clear point about such risk budgets. Rodarie 2015 has shown that if 
implemented correctly, they would require the political leaders to take full responsibility 
for their choices. While this would mean a deep change of the principles of overall 
regulatory architecture, with a long time to go, it is possible to advance in the meantime. 
 
In the meantime, the broken up piping of corporate financing might be fixed by using 
different vehicles. For instance, securitization might help either direct funding of 
middle-market companies through CLO or indirect funding of SME by securitizing 
other credits (RMBS for instance) thus freeing up regulatory capital to grant new SME 
loans. A more precise review of the options offered by securitization appears in the 
companion chapter by Daphné Héant et alii. It is up to the member states to develop 
their financial ecosystem, as it has been the case in the very last months: Renzi has 
developed private equity (Politi 2016) in Italy, while in France, the projected loi Sapin 2 
in its art. 33 is allowing to life insurance companies to shift investments to purposely set 
up pension funds in order to switch from solvency 2 to solvency 1 regulatory regime. The 
implied regulatory capital relaxation would make it easier to invest in stocks or other 
corporate liabilities, which are too heavily charged under S2. Schackmann-Fallis and 
Weiss (2014) are advocating that banks are providing the businesses with stable and 
reliable funding, which should not be substituted by tempting new gadgets; it is clear 
that with overly regulated banks, any opportunity might be overexploited by the shadow 
banking system. Hence the need for consistency among stakeholders. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The European Union, which was not the origin of the financial crisis, has almost lost a 
growth cycle to the US. Our analysis has shown that the negative effect of the Basel III 
package expected by the pre-QE studies are almost annihilated today. The recession 
must then have other causes: falling corporate lending volumes resulted from falling 
demand in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but this is longer the case. The EU is 
trying to incentivize corporate lending, via forward guidance as well as ‘supporting 
factor’ cutting down the Basel capital requirements. The macroeconomic theorists are 
trying to account for future success of monetary policy around zero nominal interest rate 
via the risk-taking channel. All these clever initiative failed to deliver. As a consequence, 
we might infer that banks are simply not taking any risks: rather than appealing to risk 
aversion, we would like to argue that the banks seem especially embarrassed by future 
regulatory developments, which appear remote and uncertain. The binding constraint 
for corporate lending and growth in the EU is then plausibly a combination of banks’ 
expectations of future regulation and strong uncertainty aversion. While we offer some 
mitigation prospects, see 4.2., we hope that the theoretical developments of the recent 
years will quickly yield both theoretical advances and practical results. 
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